Panel V: The Use of Intelligence by Policymakers

George Edwards: We now come to the final stage of the intelligence process--its use by policymakers. We're fortunate today to have three of the top officials who managed America's national security policy at the end of the Cold War. Now there's obviously one adjustment to your program. James Baker is not here this morning. He called me late yesterday afternoon and said that, in response to his recent back surgery, he's having a little trouble. We hope it's a temporary relapse. He sends his regrets. He wishes you his best, and I know he's here in spirit. And, of course, we wish him a rapid recovery. We do have, fortunately, three of America's most distinguished public servants with us this morning. They require little introduction. Richard Cheney served as White House Chief of Staff under President Ford, represented Wyoming in the House of Representatives, and rose to become Minority Whip. He served as Secretary of Defense in the Bush Administration. Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft served as National Security Advisor to Presidents Ford and Bush. In the Reagan Administration, he chaired or served on several highly important policy advisory committees. He's also Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Bush Presidential Library Foundation. Judge William Webster was serving on the US Court of Appeals when he became Director of FBI in 1978. In 1987, he was named Director of Central Intelligence, serving until 1991.

Now I've asked our speakers to speak initially for 15 minutes. I've asked Secretary Cheney and General Scowcroft to focus on two central questions. As we all

know, there are many critics of the quality of the intelligence produced by the Intelligence Community. We've had a number of defenses of the Intelligence Community already in this conference. The critics have included both Presidents and pundits alike. So the first question is, was the intelligence provided to you during your government service timely, reliable and focused on priority issues? In other words, was it useful? The second question I've posed to our panelists is also in response to another set of critics, coming from another angle. Some critics find fault not with the quality of intelligence but with the failure of policymakers to employ it. So the second question is, what role did intelligence play in the critical decisions regarding the tumultuous events at the end of the Cold War? Judge Webster served as the nexus of intelligence and policymaking at the highest levels and was the interlocutor of our other panelists. I've asked him to focus on his experiences in that position as he observed the role of intelligence in policymaking, and the reactions of policymakers to the intelligence provided to them. I'm going to take the speakers in alphabetical order, so we'll start with Secretary Cheney.

Secretary Cheney: Thank you very much. I am delighted to be here this morning and have the opportunity to participate. I've been thinking, the last few days, about what I might say, and it's not that easy a task for someone like myself. After I left government, I went out and got a job [laughter]. I'm not writing books, I actually pay taxes [laughter], so I feel a little bit handicapped here this morning with my compatriots, General Scowcroft, but I'm sure my mind will begin to focus again on these events, and I'll be able to dredge up some good war stories to share with you this morning.

At the outset, in terms of thinking about intelligence from my perspective, obviously, like everybody else, my view of the product and how it was used and how the whole process works was shaped by my experiences in government, and my first exposure, as was mentioned in the introduction, was really during the Ford years, when I used to sit and receive in my car every morning on my way to work a copy of the PDB, I guess we called it in those days, the President's Daily Brief. I was sort of a summary user, if you will; that is, I wasn't, as the Chief of Staff, I had political responsibilities and administrative responsibilities. At the time, Brent was the National Security Advisor, and he was the one who had to worry about the policy ramifications of what was there, so I sort of had a high-level view, I guess you could say, at the top to be aware of what was going on, and from time to time on particular issues if we were getting ready to go into a summit with the Soviets on arms control, and I'd spend a little bit more time digging into those areas. But, generally, it worked reasonably well from my perspective.

The second basic period of my career where I spent a lot of time on it was as a member of the House Intelligence Committee from 1985 to 1989, the last four years I was in the House. I was the senior Republican on the budget subcommittee of the Intelligence Committee, and spent a lot of time on what I came to view, and do now, as my most interesting and exciting responsibility as a member of the House. Service on the Intelligence Committee was something that you acquired primarily because the Leader asked you to go serve in that capacity, but it was a unique experience in part because it was all behind closed doors, and a lot of the partisan battles that characterize Congress disappeared once you closed the doors--the Intelligence Committee, and there was a much higher degree of bi-partisan effort, if you will, in that regard. But it also gave me the

opportunity, sitting on the budget subcommittee and on the Committee itself, to develop an overview of the agencies and how they all fit together, and also to see a fair amount of the product, but, again, without having to make decisions as an executive.

The third stage, of course, came during my time as Secretary of Defense in 1989 to early 1993, and I'm sure my views there were shaped in part by the fact that so much of the Intelligence Community is part of the Department of Defense. There's a special kind of relationship, obviously, that exists because, on the one hand, you are one of the prime consumers of what the Community has to produce, but, on the other hand, you've got oversight responsibilities, management responsibilities for the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the DIA, and all of the intelligence services of the various armed services. So you're, I guess, a consumer on the one hand, and on the other hand, certainly if not an analyst, you're sitting on top of an organization that generates an awful lot of information and analysis.

My impression when I arrived at the Defense Department was that the floodgates had opened, that there was this enormous volume of material, and that I had to find some way to screen it, to choke it down, to have it take on manageable proportions. Otherwise, I could sit at my desk all day long and do nothing but read intelligence reports. The volume, literally, was that great, especially if you made the mistake, which I did early on, when they said, "Well, what are you interested in?" I said, "Well, I'm interested in the following things," and I ticked off a long list. The next thing I knew, I was getting reports on all of those subjects.

Part of the problem, I think, is there isn't any way, there's no training, for a civilian appointee who comes to one of those Cabinet posts, and all of a sudden is a

consumer of intelligence. It's not part of the transition, there's no school for intelligence consumers. There's just sort of the assumption, when you take the oath and you sit down at the office, that you know what you're doing. And, if you're lucky, you've had a little bit of exposure to it in advance, and you have some idea of what kind of information you're going to receive, and how it fits into your responsibilities and your overall decision making, but I was always amazed—still am today—when I think about it, that there's virtually no time spent preparing that new Cabinet member for this particular aspect or phase of his job.

I had concluded that it was very important for me not to be just a passive consumer, if you will, that it really was important to establish some priorities. It was the same thing for the Department of Defense. There was no way I could do everything that needed to be done in the Department of Defense, so you establish priorities, and then you find good people, and you delegate to them to worry about all those things you don't have time to focus on, and, to some extent, you need to do the same thing in terms of your interaction with the Intelligence Community. I was fortunate during my time in the Defense Department that I had some superb people working for me. That's one of the great things about the Defense Department, it is full of some extremely competent, capable men and women who devote their lives to that sort of thing, and they're very good about sort of coming to the aid and the assistance of those of us who serve there temporarily in a civilian capacity.

If you look at the way my day worked in terms of sort of interacting with the flow of intelligence while I was there, I had every morning, when I left the house in the DoD limousine, in the back seat would be the CIA briefer, so I could get the Brief on the way

to the Pentagon that morning. Once I arrived in my office, then I'd sit down and spend some time with my military assistant. I had some great military assistants. Bill Owens, who later became Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was my first one. He was followed by Joe Lopez. Joe just retired here about a year ago, a man who went from enlisted ranks to four stars. He finished with the Southern NATO Command, extremely talented individual. And my last military assistant was General John Jumper, Air Force Officer. John is now, or has recently been, the Commander of all US Air Forces in Europe. All three of them went on to great things. At the time they were working for me, they were junior One Stars, and their mission in life, obviously, was to help me, and we had a standard practice that allowed for them to, in effect, screen a lot of that material that was going to bubble up to my desk every day, sit down oftentimes and get Briefs in advance before I arrived, and then I could sit down and have a session with them first order of business in the office every morning. And they would distill for me the essence of what was coming up, especially through DIA and that side of the house.

Beyond that, obviously, there were a whole series of opportunities to use the product from the Community in connection with special briefings, in connection with regular responsibilities, time to sit down, for example, and make a decision on procuring a major weapons system. You'd always start with a threat brief, some kind of an assessment of what the competition was likely to be out there, or what the world would look like in a particular arena in the years ahead, because that obviously then would, theoretically anyway, drive the decisions you'd make about what kind of aircraft we needed, or whether or not we needed more submarines, or whether or not we really wanted to invest in a new weapons system.

Periodically, I ran seminars. Attended seminars would be a better way to put it. Paul Wolfowitz, you saw here earlier this morning, organized for me, on a fairly regular basis during my time in the Pentagon, a series of Saturday morning sessions where we would bring in folks from within DoD, people from the Agency, George Kolt's here. George used to be a regular participant in those sessions. We were focused especially on what was going on in those days in the Soviet Union. We would bring in, as well, academics, and sometimes we'd mix it up a bit, but the idea was that we could sit down, I could with a few of my senior people in the Pentagon and interact with the experts inside and outside government to focus on, in this particular case, developments in the Soviet Union. I found that enormously valuable. The product the Agency produced was very good, but it was much more effective for me, in terms of my understanding, if I had the opportunity following that on a regular basis to then be able to sit down on a periodic basis and be able to discuss with experts what does this mean, what does that mean, what should we be thinking about, and so forth. I found those sessions invaluable.

Later on, after the Soviet Union came apart, we continued a series of special briefings on a fairly regular basis in the Department for myself, General Powell, three or four of our other senior people, that was focused specifically on the status of the military forces of the former Soviet Union. What was happening to their strategic rocket forces, how good were their troops, what kinds of discipline problems and morale problems were they dealing with—just, I'd say, a very specific focus on military capabilities.

When we got over into another area of responsibility, obviously, the intelligence took on a whole different meaning, in a sense, and that was when we got involved in the conduct of military operations. When the balloon went up, and it was time to deploy the

force and actually use the force, then sort of the pace and activity would shift inside the building, and you'd become very much focused on a particular part of the world, for example, the Gulf during the course of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and intelligence played a vital role there, including the morning session. Again, the first thing we'd do every morning, General Powell and I would sit down in the Command Center and be briefed, first by Mike McConnell. I think I saw Mike, he was here, he then was the intelligence officer off the Joint Staff. We'd follow that up then with the operational briefing from Tom Kelly, who was the J-3 on the Joint Staff, but that was a regular standard pattern. Again, in this case, of course, the focus would shift. You were more concerned about the status of Iraqi forces, about things that may have happened in a very short period of time, a lot more tactical intelligence information, obviously, that was going to be important in terms of making decisions in this case about preparations for and ultimately conduct of those operations.

If I were to try to characterize it overall, I think we were very, very well served on balance, that we got a vast amount of information, and I think we got a lot of excellent analysis, a lot of it thought-provoking, that required us to really think about what we were doing and why we were doing it. It wasn't always right, by any means. There were problems on occasion. There were occasions when there were differences of opinion.

One that comes to mind that you may have discussed this week that we might want to talk about a little bit this morning, had to do with this question of the size of the Soviet economy. I had a man working for me, Harry Rowan, who had at one point worked out at the Agency, I believe, as part of the National Intelligence Council, an economist from the Hoover Institution out at Stanford. Harry I had hired to work with

Paul Wolfowitz and some of the others up in the policy shop, and Harry argued, I think with some justification now viewed with the benefit of hindsight, that the official estimates of how big the Soviet economy was were inflated. That, in fact, their economy was smaller than the data indicated, and that was important because that meant that they were spending a bigger percentage of their GNP on the military than was thought. So if you halve the size of the economy, and you kept the military the same size, obviously, you've doubled the percentage that was going for defense. I don't mean to criticize anybody in that regard. The fact was I had access to different interpretations. I found Harry's information persuasive. It all moved in the same direction, I think, but, I think, he gets some credit, or should get some credit, for identifying a problem for the Soviets as part of a trend that turned out to be historically of considerable significance.

Another place where we had discussion and difference of opinion within the Community had to do with the latter stages of the war in the Gulf, when there was a debate between CIA, on the one hand, and our forces in the theater on the other, on how much Iraqi armor we had destroyed. We'd set a target for ourselves that we wanted to destroy 50 percent of the Iraqi armor before we launched the ground war; we wanted to use our air assets to take out 50 percent, roughly, of their tanks and so forth. We thought we'd gotten there, and we were very close to launching the ground war, but then the Agency believed--had a different interpretation of the data--that suggested that we had not destroyed as much of the Iraqi armor as we thought we had. All of this ended up with the three of us in a meeting in Brent's office, accompanied by various and sundry other experts from various places. We finally sorted it out and went forward with the attack as planned on the timetable as planned, and, in that particular case, I felt the theater

commander and the military had somewhat better data, partly because they had access to things that were not immediately available to the Agency. The Agency was focused on national assets, and controlled those national assets, but out in the theater, we also had pilot reports, and bomb damage assessment tactical intelligence flown by tactical aircraft. And, in that particular case, again, I think we were well served by having a variety of difference sources and point of view that we could look at and then come to a conclusion on a very important piece of business. It was no small matter to make sure we had done everything we could from the air before we committed our ground forces to battle.

But, say, overall experience, certainly one of the highlights of my career, was the privilege of working with the Intelligence Community and all the people that were a part of it, and, as I say, while we didn't always get it right, on balance, those of us who were in a position to interact with the Community, to rely on them for advice and information and make decisions on it, I think we were very well served.

GE: Thank you. General Scowcroft.

General Scowcroft: I pointed out to Dick when we sat down that I had two microphones and he only had one. He said I needed all the help I could get. One comment which relates to the previous Panel, and that is the element of collegiality. As I look here at Dick, and look down at President Bush, in 1975, President Bush was Director of Central Intelligence. I was National Security Advisor, and Dick Cheney was Chief of Staff. So, for 25 years, we have known, worked together off and on, and that makes an enormous

amount of different in how you can work together. A lot of things you take for granted, you don't have to go back to square one, because you understand each other.

Well, George has asked some interesting questions. Basically, was the intelligence good and how did we use it? To the great frustration of the Intelligence Community, the decision maker doesn't know what he needs until he needs it. And we kept getting these things, "Set down your requirements in priority." And, you know, we'd get these lists, but a crisis comes, and you're sitting around the Oval Office and somebody says, "Well, how many of this do they have?" and it might be a crisis that nobody's even thought about before in an area that nobody's thought about before. So, the Intelligence Community gets no help from the decision maker in identifying what the decision maker's going to need, because he doesn't know it until he's looking at a problem and says, "Well, how about this?" That makes it tough.

The purpose of intelligence is, the decision maker, in any kind of crisis—even in day-to-day stuff—is operating in an area of ambiguity and lack of hard data. And, so, what he's searching for is to bring an element of certainty to this vague notion out here in order that he can inform his decisions by some concrete facts. And that's really the purpose of intelligence. It's only one input, but it is designed to allow the President to make decisions based on the best information that is available. All of this, though, makes it very hard to analyze how good the intelligence is, much less how we use it.

But that's not the only answer. Another factor is the confidence of the policymaker in what he's being given. There are two elements to that. The three Presidents that I worked for looked at the product very differently. President Nixon, at least publicly, manifested considerable disdain for the PDB and frequently would push it

aside when we would suggest that he read it. He sort of thought, in a way, the State Department had been captured by the Democrats a long time ago, and the CIA was mostly from Ivy League colleges, and so that was the kind of framework in which he looked. Now, he had enormous respect for Dick Helms. Enormous. But that....Dick Helms was different from the institution. President Ford was very different. He'd never planned to be President. He had worked with the intelligence committees in the Congress and so on, but he devoured the PDB, and sort of uncritically taking it to improve his background. President Bush did it differently, still. Having been the producer of the intelligence, he would take out the PDB and look at it, not only for what it had in it, but how it was done, what wasn't in it that should be, was it presented the right way, and the poor intelligence briefer who brought it in for him to read sometimes got quite a grilling on it. But that is a reflection of the job that intelligence has, and how the President looks at the product. Whether he thinks it's a bunch of pap or whether he really is able to make use of it.

And then the intelligence itself sort of divides up into different levels of confidence. The first is facts, you know, the Soviet Union has so many ICBMs, so many warheads, and so on. There is a tendency to say, "Okay, that's the way it is." And there's a great deal of credence to that. The second category is, the facts plus an interpretation. Yeltsin collapsed in a meeting and they took him to the hospital. What does that likely mean? Did he have a bad headache, or are there some complications to it? And then the last category, that of predictions--looking out, what is going to happen to the Soviet Union? What's happening to the Soviet economy? All these kinds of things.

And the confidence of the decision maker in the intelligence goes down with each one of these categories. He trusts the experts so that the facts are taken pretty much

wholesale. Interpretation, a little less so, but since they're so intimately related to the facts, and the expert is going to know more about the surrounding circumstances, yes. But when you get to the predictions, there's a lot of skepticism on the part of the decision maker, again, depending on his personality, but frequently to the point that they're considered just one opinion of another. I'll get back to that in just a minute.

There are some other factors that the decision maker, at least some of them who have had some relations with the Intelligence Community, also think about, and, especially with respect to estimates, and that is the objectivity of the intelligence that is given when you have the expert analysis attached to the facts themselves. The estimators, for example—there used to be annually a National Security Estimate of the Soviet Union, what it was doing, how it was coming in defense, what its economy was, and so on and so forth. Well, for a long time, that was done by the same group of estimators each year. Well, there's a human tendency, when you make an estimate in 1974, when you're doing another one in 1975, was to make the '74 one look like you're really prescient. So that, in the end, you know, can over a period of years, lead one astray.

And then there is the possibility of just plain bias in the people who make up the estimates. President Bush, as DCI, set up an experiment to test the amount of bias. He set up an "A" team, which was a team who actually made the estimates, and then a "B" team, a collection of people who had a common philosophical attitude at that time toward the Soviet Union, to see whether or not the estimates varied with the attitudes, with the philosophy if you will, of the estimators. I thought it was a great experiment. Unfortunately, somebody from team "B" leaked their estimate to the press, and it turned

into a disaster. But, you know, these are all the kinds of things that run through the mind of the decision maker.

Another factor that sometimes comes in, is what I would call "mindset." My favorite story about mindset was the run-up to the 1973 war in—the Arab-Israeli War of '73. The Arab states normally had exercises every September in which they would move the troops around, and test things, and all this. They did it again in 1973, but this time, there were a lot more troops involved and so on, and it was watched carefully. But it was just the annual exercises, and this went on for a month, and I'll never forget the Saturday morning we had just received word of the Egyptians and the Syrians attacking the Israelis, and I picked up the PDB, and it said, "Notwithstanding the fact that the exercises are very realistic this year, we anticipate there will be no attack."

Well, what I think had happened is this: that to the analyst, an attack was unlikely because it made no military sense. It wasn't anybody that thought that the Egyptians and the Syrians could take on, successfully, the Israelis. And since it didn't make any military sense, it wouldn't happen. But what they left out was the fact that Sadat, at the time, wasn't trying to win the war. What he was trying to do was make an attack and shift things around enough in the Middle East that he could get negotiations going again, because they'd absolutely been frozen. Anyway, that was just an interesting anecdote. Back to estimates. Incidentally, after....what happened after the '73 war is that they weren't going to make that mistake again, so I used to get calls about every third night, in the middle of the night, with suspicious-looking troop movements that presaged another attack. [laughter]

Back to estimates. Are they really worth the effort? Your book is a wonderful collection of estimates. How seriously are they taken? Are they worth the effort? They're not worth the effort if you expect them to predict exactly what will happen. That's what the press frequently does. Most of the press attacks, or, "Ah ha, they didn't anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ah ha, they didn't anticipate that Saddam Hussein was actually going to attack." But, I think that misses the point. I can't remember—Paul Wolfowitz, maybe, in the last.....on the Gulf War attack. Yes, CIA did say that it was likely they were going to attack, but we had a political problem, and that is Mubarek, King Hussein, were saying, "Hey, it's just a bluff. Don't do it, and you'll screw it up. Just leave it alone." So what do you do in those circumstances? And, in fact, we did the right thing because then when the attack came, there was nobody in the Arab world who could blame us for provoking Saddam Hussein.

The collapse of the Soviet Union is another interesting one. If you look at what actually happened, you can say that the Soviet Union maybe will collapse. What does that mean? And, I think, in fact, if Yeltsin had had a heart attack in the summer of 1971 [1991?] and been out of the picture, my guess is the Soviet Union would not have disappeared. That it might have turned into a confederation of Russia and the other states, but I think one of the principal factors in the end of the Soviet Union was the bitter hatred between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, and that Yeltsin literally pulled the Soviet Union out from under Gorbachev as a way to get him out of the way. Now, there isn't any way that intelligence is going to be able to predict, nor is it the important thing.

The one thing I wish the Intelligence Community had said is--we worried about a coup against Gorbachev, a coup with him or against him, all from 1989 and all.....as soon

as the trouble started in Eastern Europe. Were the conservatives going to crack down? One of the things the Intelligence Community did not tell us is, that when the coup actually came, that the people we had been dreading for 20 years, the head of the KGB, the head of the military, the head of internal intelligence, all these great guys who're running this great machine, acted like a bunch of Keystone cops.

What intelligence estimates do for the policymaker is to remind him what forces are at work, what their trends are, and what are some possibilities he has to consider. They form part of the environment in which he makes a decision. Are they ignored sometimes? You bet. Are they wrong sometimes? You bet. But they do serve the purpose of expanding the view of the policymaker. Intelligence is not the Oracle of Delphi, although the press treats it pretty much that way. It's crucial, I think, to the policymaker in reducing his error rate in making decisions. If it is good, that is, if he has confidence in the product he receives, he will use it. If he doesn't, he won't. But he invariably factors intelligence into the other elements that surround any crisis as he makes his decision. Thank you.

GE: Thank you. Judge Webster.

Judge Webster: Thank you. I've already apologized to Paul Wolfowitz for my sudden departure, briefly, during his speech. The last time that happened was about 12 years ago, I was speaking to a large number of judges, Justice Harry Blackmun...I was there on the front row and Justice Harry Blackmun was the speaker, and I had to make a similar departure accompanied by four Security officers in a rush, which so completely distracted

the audience and also the speaker about what possible crisis had obtained. I noticed this time that that did not happen. I did not have Security officers following me, and this well-informed audience could recognize one too many cups of coffee when they saw one. [laughter]

I did want to say a brief word about the Deputies Committee because it functioned so supremely well, and served Brent and the President so well. It was born, as I remember, the crisis function, was born out of one of the President's more frustrating days when there was an abortive coup attempt in Panama resulting in the complete failure of the effort. It was not under CIA handling or supervision. We were briefly informed, as was the military, of what was taking place, but, in the meantime, it happened.....I was in Spain en route to Germany to meet with my counterpart, who wanted to talk about the reunification of Germany a few weeks before the Berlin Wall went down. Dick Kerr was keeping me very well informed about what was happening. As I remember, the President was entertaining a senior officer, or chief of state, of another country, Cabinet officers were wandering in and out of the Oval office to pay their respects and have meetings, and no one knew what was taking place. Dick Cheney called me and others, and we had that meeting in Brent Scowcroft's office, and I think I made one suggestion that maybe we activate those very secure teleconferencing systems that we had in the different components of the National Security office. Senior officials don't like to use them to exercise, because they're afraid they're going to look bad, but maybe there was somebody who could always be available with that system. And it worked very, very well in subsequent crises, such as the insurrection in the Philippines. It also was a partially good answer to the problem that Dick Helms used to talk about when we'd get a sudden call to

come to the White House. From Langley, that's a little bit of a distance. And they're hand him ten pounds of briefing materials, and he'd sit in the back of his car and hold them, and say, "O s m o s i s." [laughter]

Well, let me speak for just a minute about my observations about the process, and how I sense that the policymakers responded to it. Now, I'm not a policymaker. I'm up here to comment on how I think they responded to it. In fact, I took my cue from some language in President Bush's book as he came into office, about how it was important that not only that the DCI not be a policymaker, but that he not be seen to be a policymaker, or attempting to be a policymaker. And, for that reason, when I came on board, I asked President Reagan to revert to the practice of not having the DCI as a member of his Cabinet.

The official papers, intelligence papers, or production, consisted primarily of the President's Daily Brief, about which you heard President Bush talk yesterday, the NID, the National Intelligence Daily, and the various estimates produced by the NFIB, made up of representatives of the Intelligence Community reacting to papers prepared by the National Intelligence Officers on particular subjects, reporting to the DCI and not part of the CIA.

The PDB was a very important document to us, and to the President. And he set the tone for it. He allowed Brent, of course, and Bob Gates to see it. Dick Cheney, Jim Baker, and, occasionally, someone else if they needed to see it, but, in all cases, we retrieved the documents rather than leaving them to be potentially copied. Now, they were about 18 pages, as I remember. The last thing I did before I went to bed was to review the night draft, knowing that it would be revised all night until 4:00 o'clock in the

morning, when they had to go to print, and then I spent my time in the car coming down to meet with the President, the Briefer, and Brent, and Bob and, occasionally, John Sununu, trying to catch up with the changes and the editorial things, and glance at the newspaper knowing that the President would have read five newspapers before I got there and wanted to know if I'd read an editorial or a comment relative to intelligence. It was an interesting exercise.

The estimates represented in some ways, as Brent put it, a view of the universe and the trends that were likely to take place, and there was some level of accommodation between different points of view reflected in trying to get out a single document. Where to put the alternative points of view, where to reflect dissenting opinions, and how to do so so that it still might be of some value to the policymakers? Never entirely successful, but I think we did work to make sure that....particularly Congressional committees, were complaining that alternative points of view were reflected on the same page as the main estimates, so not buried in the end notes. We even prepared a White Paper, which was an executive summary of the longer estimates, knowing that we could not really expect the senior policymakers to find time to read those documents. I only remember one....coming once to the morning meeting with the President and giving him the full text of a much shorter document, I think on El Salvador, saying that I didn't think the White Paper captured it, that he might want to read the full document. The next morning, he told me a little solemnly that he had read the whole document, and I did not take the bit, because I think if I had said, "How did you like it?" I wouldn't have liked what I had to hear. But the President set the tone, and in consequence, everyone on the policy team wanted to be sure that they read what they knew the President had read, and that was

great for the Intelligence Community, and a practice that I fear is no longer followed, and regrettably so.

The other papers that came up covered specific issues and responded to specific kinds of questions that the President asked, and others with whom we met. I had a weekly routine of meeting for breakfast with Dick Cheney, around noon with Jim Baker, and then on Thursday, a very pleasant late-afternoon meeting with Brent and Bob to talk about things that were not necessarily in any of the papers, or were in the papers, but we'd developed some new information, or what were the concerns of the policymakers so that we could better serve them and to be sure that we could.....that our messages were getting through and getting through accurately.

In all of this, I think it would be fair to say that there was a very clear preference among the policymakers for the current intelligence rather than the estimates, for some of the reasons I've already given and partly because of time constraints. One possible exception might have been Dick Cheney, who liked to remind us, and I think accurately, that much of what he was doing was planning for something....for military equipment and capabilities that would not be in place for another 14 or 15 years, and, so these trends were perhaps of greater interest to someone like Dick than someone who was trying to deal with the day-to-day crises.

From time to time, particularly in crisis moments, we'd turn to our estimates of crucially important military information. Did Saddam Hussein have chemical warheads for his SCUDS? We believed that he did. Colin Powell believed that he did not. And after the war, I got a lovely card from him in long hand, saying, "You guys had it right." That was after Saddam Hussein acknowledged having 24 or more CW warheads. So

there was always a...what we said was not the last word. What we said was our best view of it. And each department had other intelligence services giving other information not always consistent. We'd call it competitive analysis, and I think that was worthwhile, and worth doing, but everyone paid attention to what the best guesses were.

Dick Cheney mentioned a minute ago the rather somber meeting we had when we were so far apart on our best analysis of the degrading of Saddam's armor in the field. We did not have synoptic coverage. We only could do what the imagery brought around the circle and try to make proper interpolations of that, but it was inconsistent with what we were getting from the field commanders on that particular issue. The Agency never took a contrary position to the question of morale that Paul made reference to earlier today; that was a subject on which there was no dispute. We knew that the poorest military units were on the front, the Republican Guard was held back and protected, the issue was there because the President had authorized a ground invasion when 50 percent had been degraded, and we were not getting the same figures.

(Side B)

Judge Webster (Continued): We got some support from the post-war when we owned the battlefield, and Mike McConnell could do that study, but the important thing was to make sure we had all put into the hopper what we could, in the most accurate way that we could. I think we still have an open question of the proper role of the Intelligence Community once a military engagement has started. The Secretary of Defense, the President, and others, are in charge. The role of intelligence is not to confuse, or to urge

different conclusions or timing, but simply to try to make sure that, as best we can, in the fog of war, the best information is reaching the decision makers.

In terms of the Cold War...my experience was that in the whole area of Soviet intelligence, there were really differing theories of how Gorbachev was doing. I call it the glass half full and the glass half empty approach to the same set of facts. And, sometimes I know that must have been frustrating to the policymakers, and the best I could do in that respect was to bring those who reflected different views as to the ultimate outcome of Gorbachev and his programs and where it was taking us. I think you've heard, yesterday, a full range of discussion about the, and the day before, a full range of discussion of the kinds of estimates we were putting out about the problems that Gorbachev was in, but, in terms of whether or not he'd work his way through it, we had differing points of view. The best thing we could do was to make sure that the policymakers had the opportunity to hear them.

Policymakers tend to form their own personal judgments about the personalities of the leaders on the other side of the equation. And that was particularly true in terms of Soviet leaders. Over time, my impression, and the President's here—he can take issue with me—but my impression was that, when he took office, he was somewhat more skeptical of Gorbachev than was President Reagan. And he kept his counsel, kept his mind open, but he was not buying into an immediate conclusion that all was sweetness and light with Gorbachev and his future. He became more personally acquainted with him, developed a level of confidence in him, and some of the policymakers who similarly worked with Gorbachev were skeptical about the reports that we put out about the emergence of Yeltsin and the slow erosion of Gorbachev's authority and support in the

Soviet Union. We were even chided a little bit about pushing, "Why are you pushing Yeltsin?" We were saying, "We're not pushing Yeltsin. We want you to know that our intelligence says he's coming on strong, and that he is going to be a factor in the future." That's somewhat typical of the kinds of give and take which I thought were very helpful and useful and healthy.

We tried to be helpful to the various.....to President Reagan and President Bush in terms of their contacts with leaders, some of whom they already knew and some of whom they did not. We even provided a three-dimensional video for President Reagan when he made his first trip to Moscow on the buildings he would be in, and what he would see as he went up the stairs and around the corner so that he would not be a total stranger and have some familiarity with it. We didn't have to educate President Bush about many people, because he had been working with them in the United Nations and other places, and they'd grown up into positions of high power, and many of them he knew much better than we did.

We even tried to provide, and I think not too well, a medical history of the leaders and what was happening to them that might affect their ability to perform and their future. And our Medical Services Division were doing the best they could with people they had not treated themselves. Many times we got reports that somebody was on the brink of death with nine fatal diseases, and most of that was true, but what they didn't take into account, it seems to me, is how did those people get to be leaders in the first place? Their capacities for survival, their inner strengths? So, while we provided that information, and there was a lot of appetite for it, I never felt that that was of the quality level that the other kinds of information about the individual leaders turned out to be.

Well, what was the policymakers' reaction to what we were doing? As I said before, I think they grabbed on to the current intelligence much more quickly, and, in many cases, assigned the estimates to other people to boil down and massage for them. Occasionally, there would be some "kill the messenger" attitude, such as I've just talked about in relation to Yeltsin's rise. Occasionally, there would be some legitimate angst about public statements that we felt obliged to make, both in terms of public accountability and the question raised earlier this morning about our accountability to the Hill, where we had to make both closed-door testimony and public testimony about the state of the world and the issues that were confronting us. Sometimes, we said things that were not timely.

There was a lot of joking about a situation in which Dick Cheney was putting in for his budget just as I had to give public testimony that concluded that the Warsaw Pact breakup was irreversible. And someone asked him what he thought of that, and he said, "Truthfully, it wasn't helpful." [laughter]

General Scowcroft: I'm sure just that way.

Judge Webster: Well, I could live with that. I could live with that, because he didn't say it was wrong. Something that isn't known is that I got a call from Dick Cheney after that. Cartoons were starting to come out, so I got a call from him right away, saying that he wanted to make it very clear that he expected not only the CIA but the military components of intelligence, DIA, NSA, and so forth who worked for him, to tell it as they

saw it. Now what he didn't say, but what I think was implied, was that I should be more careful about when I announced that kind of thing. [laughter]

Working with the military is, of course, one of the most important things that the Intelligence Community can do. I think there is still some uncertainty about what our role should be in times of military engagement, and I don't know the answer to that. We simply offered what we had, did not try to cause people to change their minds, and tried to be as useful as we could. I recall one meeting with General Galvin in Germany, when he told me how very important it was that he have advance warning of any kind of a Soviet stand-up, break-out offensive. The reason was that we didn't have enough troops in Europe to withstand that kind of an attack, and that he was going to need to build a political will for reinforcements and the sooner that he had that information the better. So, many of the things that took place were designed to provide that advanced warning for that purpose, including putting sensors in the Soviet Union to see if we could count any kind of extra movement out of military or industrial plants. We were, up until those last two years, we were listening for hiccups, any sign of a shift would be important. Our imagery was, I think, providing extraordinary information with respect to the mobile missiles which were concealed in the woods and the forests, and we were trying to provide an accurate count for them. Extraordinary things were taking place in terms of underwater activity, going after the test missiles to pick them up and determine their throw weight, and a whole range of other things for which many brave people have not gotten adequate credit, but which did receive the appropriate amount of attention and credibility within the Department of Defense.

As far as the spending costs are concerned, I readily acknowledge during my period and others before, that we did not have those numbers right, but we were collecting them on a kind of consistent basis like the Mercator projection—many of the others of you who served in the Navy, as did I, know that the Mercator projection is all wrong, but it's been getting people back and forth to their destination for thousands of years, and so one has to ask the question, "Would a fraction of a percentage on gross national product, or would a difference of percentage on how much was being spent on the military have caused President Reagan or President Bush to pull back on our efforts to maintain military superiority during those tense periods?"

A word about the surrogate wars which were in play in the Iran—the Contras, rather, pardon me, the Contras in Latin America, the efforts in Angola with Savimbi, the efforts in Cambodia, and in Afghanistan. Here, again, we paid a lot of attention to what we were able to do to distract the efforts of the Evil Empire to expand its influence in the Third World, and I think history will probably say that in Afghanistan despite more recent criticisms about were we training terrorists. We were not training terrorists. We were training patriotic Afghan tribes on how to defend themselves and get the Russians out of Afghanistan. These were not the only people that came in to help. There were many other people who came in who might fill the category of terrorism. But I think history will record that this was one of the watershed times. The impact on the Russian military, on their military leaders, and the backfire on the political government, as a result of their failure to keep their puppet in control of Kabul, and the damage to morale of seeing thousands of Russian soldiers returned in body bags, was one of those critical factors, in my view, that resulted ultimately in the breakup of the Soviet Union. I found that the

policymakers were all extraordinarily interested in those efforts which were, particularly in Afghanistan where we weren't allowed in Afghanistan, and we had to do all of the work through our representatives and agents training these Mujahedin, and keeping the support of King Fahd and others who helped with the heavy cost of doing so, and made better allies and friends in the process. A good operation, and it was fully supported, not only by the policymakers, but by the select committees of the Congress.

We had some problems along the way that fall in the category of "intentions." Human intelligence is designed to primarily to understand the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries better than we can do from imagery, or judgments made in other ways. Sometimes it simply is hard to obtain, either because we're in a heavily denied area, or because, as Kissinger once said.....I asked this....I talked to Henry Kissinger one time about our problems after Tiananmen Square where we could watch and know that the leaders had left their offices and gone into bunkers, but still the attitude in the Square left us uncertain as to what they were going to do. We knew when they brought people, brought divisions from outside the area which would be less likely to be sympathetic to the young people in the Square, we still did not know and could not predict with accuracy when or what they would do. Kissinger simply said, "Well, you couldn't know until Deng Xiaoping knows." And that is one of the main challenges with leaders who are in control is what they are going to do in those given situations. You can have an informed....I think that's what Brent was talking about when he said, "We have facts, and then we have interpretation, and whether or not we can make that judgment".....and I found the policymakers, even when we attempted to make those, preferred to listen to us

and be impressed by what we said, but were still going to make their own judgment as to what was going to take place.

Covert action was a part of our role. It is not a part of our assessments, but we were certainly assessing what was taking place as a result of our covert actions. You might call it diplomacy and war by other means. And, in many of the cases, the things that we did did not succeed, but in others, they were tremendously successful, such as the Radio Liberty effort that was described by General Kalugin, in terms of the impact. We had books on the Federalist Papers that were widely consumed in Warsaw Pact areas and in the western parts of the Soviet Union. Those were proactive things, but we had to assess whether or not they would succeed. We also had to deal with the issues of how much disinformation could we put out to confuse our enemies in the field. We had a number of proactive things we wanted to do in Afghanistan, but the possibility that the American press would pick it up and report something that was not true that was attributable to us was of ongoing concern to the policymakers, but, in the main, they allowed us to do the things that we thought were worth doing. Other decisions as to whether to use drones to attack Soviet transports on the ground resulted in interesting debates, but, in the main, I think our covert actions received real support.

I want to say that I don't think much of this would have worked without Brent Scowcroft. He's a truly honest broker. I was very comfortable with Bob Gates and with Dick Kerr representing the DCI on the Deputies Committee, but none of this would have been as encouraging to me if I thought that once the information got to the National Security Advisor, it was going to be twisted to support a personal point of view, or be influenced by a Chief of Staff who was concerned about the political implications on the

Congress. Brent simply provided the President with the opinions of every policymaker and anything that I could add when he thought that he could call to get my input to give the President, and I always knew that it was being presented objectively. He might have an opinion on what we said, but he got our points of view to the President, and the President was always in a position to act based upon the real opinions of his team. That, to me, was the essence of good intelligence work, and good intelligence relationships, and one for which I think President Bush and Brent deserve enormous credit, as we entered a new world of transformation—more things happening in those two years than I think had happened in the whole history of the Intelligence Community after World War II. It was a pleasure to be there and to have the privilege of working with them. Thank you.

GE: Thank you very much. We now have plenty of time for questions, which is very helpful, because we encourage you to come down to the mics on either side, and it also saves me from having to ask Cabinet-level officials to be quiet.

QUESTION: [Name lost,] Hoover Institution. My question is to Brent Scowcroft. Yesterday, while speaking at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Governor George W. Bush said that the Soviet empire is destroyed, but the evil is still out there. A couple of hours later, speaking at the George Bush Presidential Library, Dr. Robert Gates concluded his remarks by saying that the United States won the Cold War. Mr. Scowcroft, do you think it is fair to declare a victory when the evil you were fighting against, and according to James Woolsey, the main remaining adversary in 1990 was the Russian military machine, so when this evil is still alive and even kicking? Thank you.

General Scowcroft: Well, to say that we won the Cold War, I think, is something entirely separate from what you say. The West, the British, French and Americans, won World War I, too, but that didn't mean that there were no problems left. We won World War II, but it was, perhaps, the occupation of Germany and Japan over a period of years which helped the transformation of those countries to a democratic philosophy. That has not happened. The Soviet Union is gone. We did win the Cold War. Although we tried....at the time, we tried not to say that we won the war. What we tried to say is everybody won, because the Cold War was ended, and, I think, we sometimes forget in our dealings with Russia that it's important that they have their pride, and gratuitous humiliation of them doesn't help. Are there elements inside Russia who are nostalgic for the empire? You bet. There's no question about it. Are they controlling the system? I don't think so, now. I'm not sure if anybody's really controlling the system, but they certainly are there. And there are those who think, those in Russia who think, for example, of what's going on in Central Asia, and the Caucasus, the Caspian, and so on, is only their business and not anybody else's, and that someday the Soviet empire will be reconstructed, but we're not going to, we're not going to end the thinking of people. What we need to try to do is to support the progressive elements in Russia and to encourage it as it searches for its soul, which it's doing now, to come out with answers compatible with a useful role in society.

QUESTION: I'm Joseph Harrihan, a historian. I have a question about intelligence, leadership, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and your arms control initiatives, unilateral

arms control initiatives in September of 1991. The question addresses the really inherent conservatism of intelligence, vis-à-vis leadership in world affairs. When the Soviet Union was collapsing, following the coup, in August of 1991, President Bush convened a National Security Council meeting in which he asked the Principals to go back to their departments and to draw up a list of further arms control reductions in the strategic field. And you did so. And a month later, it was announced on September 27th 1991. My question is, was the dramatic reductions that were made in September 1991 informed by intelligence and, specifically, did you think you could verify these reductions which were, of course, going to be reciprocal in a few days from the Russians? It's to Secretary Cheney and to General Scowcroft.

Secretary Cheney: I think it would be fair to say that intelligence clearly played a role in the package we put together, but there were some background information there that, I think, needs to be pointed out. At the direction of the President, and after extended conversations with Brent, I had initiated some months before, in the Department of Defense, a complete review of the SIOP. There had not been a totally thorough review of the SIOP for a good long period of time. Steve Hadley, who's here today--Steve participated in it. General Butler, then off the Joint Staff, participated in it. General Powell and I together gave the direction to the Department to undertake this review. And, basically, what the review showed was that if you sat down and you looked at the targets, and the SIOP, of course, being the Single Integrated Operating Plan—it's the war plan for using your nuclear weapons. And, if you sat down and you looked at the inventory of weapons that we had available, and you looked at the potential targets, it was clear that

we had a lot more weapons than we needed to cover the target base. We had done a very thorough study, intelligence played a significant role in it, but, basically, we were prepared when the President asked us to go back and see what we could offer up by way of additional initiatives in the arms control area, we'd done our homework so that we had, in fact, a specific proposal that we could go back with and say, "Here's what we think we can do." And it was the very dramatic changes that we then announced, and, as I recall, we did away with....recommended doing away with land-based MIRVs, we recommended going with significantly lower numbers of ICBMs, we took the bomber force off alert, we took all of our tactical nuclear weapons that had been deployed at sea and brought those home. It was the most dramatic proposal in the arms control arena that I think any President ever made. But it was, in fact, based upon a lot of work that had gone before, and intelligence had played an important part in that, and we, obviously, we were confident we could verify compliance with those provisions based on our national capabilities.

General Scowcroft: I would just add one point about the tactical nuclear weapons, which was a unilateral initiative which Gorbachev announced he would reciprocate, but we did that unilaterally. Incidentally, the President pushed us from 1989 on saying, "Look, the situation is changing. Let's not just sit tight and let it happen. Let's get out in front. Let's think, what can we do? What can we do?" So, on the tactical stuff, Dick and I talked a lot, we had a new situation in Europe with German unification, and that is most of the tactical weapons were short-range weapons, and they'd go off in Germany. The Germans didn't think much of that. So we had a political problem there. In Korea, this

was the time of a slight warming of relations at the moment, and the South Koreans were interested in negotiating with the North, in having our nuclear weapons in Korea out of there. We didn't want to take them out unilaterally just from Korea, because it would look like we were pulling back from Asia, and that's the last thing we wanted to think about. So, and the third element was, tactical nuclear weapons on Navy ships. Most of them were anti-submarine, mining, and so on, and the Navy really didn't need them anymore. So, to do all of these things, we decided we'd make a broad statement about removing tactical nuclear weapons across the board. Now intelligence played a minor role in that. We didn't need these forces anymore, and, for political reasons, they were not useful, but it did result in the Soviets reciprocating. Now they haven't done nearly as much as we have in carrying it out. But it was a, you know, a decision based on the President saying, "Get out and do something useful," and us calculating what forces we need, and which ones we could get rid of.

QUESTION: Dan Halpin, Cloak and Dagger Books, Bedford, New Hampshire. Wanted to, first of all, thank all the participants for making this an absolutely wonderful two-day session. I appreciate your giving up your time to come down and entertain us. Judge Webster, you mentioned the Medical Division in your talk, and very little has been written about the Medical Division, but it prompted me to think that with that division liaising with the best medical advice in the world, do you think we fully utilized that in our diplomatic and intelligence ways, to reach out to other governments to maybe provide them with some of that medical expertise to keep their leaders healthy and happy and friendly to the United States?

Judge Webster: Well, I think most of the leaders we were second guessing on their health were not exactly our closest friends. [laughter] But I don't want to leave the impression that the Medical Services Division wasn't doing enormously helpful work for us. In addition to that particular assignment, they took care of our covert agents and officers overseas, and dealt with a lot of strange diseases to which Americans would be more susceptible. And really did an outstanding job. Traveled with officials abroad. But, my point was, I don't know how much information they had, and some of it, I'm sure, is true, but in terms of projecting longevity, it's pretty had to make that call. I think, increasingly, we didn't rely on that information, and bet at the bank on somebody checking out sooner than they would, or did.

General Scowcroft: You know, if I could just add, though, I think the Medical Unit did a terrific job about Yeltsin, you know, what his problems were, how they were likely to be manifested, and they gave us a feel for what was going on with Yeltsin and his periodic trips down to a spa and so on and so forth, and that I think were very helpful.

QUESTION: Gene Pettit, a retired CIA scientific intelligence officer. Clearly, things went very well for the Intelligence Community during the Bush Administration, but it might not have been always that way prior to that Administration. For instance, JFK was let down by the intelligence in the Bay of Pigs, and the DCI, Allen Dulles, had to resign. President Johnson, very strong willed, seemed to think he knew best, and his DCI, John McCone resigned. President Nixon may have, in fact, used and abused his DCI.

President Carter, it seems to me, to have had a predisposition about intelligence, and his DCI began to downsize the CIA right away, and I heard yesterday that he may have closed down the Moscow Station. What would you say to some of these young people here today that might be a future DCI—what advice or would you say about the future of the intelligence to protect or guard themselves from the next president, who might not be a George Bush?

Judge Webster: Well, this is an interesting problem. I was just very lucky in my President. Jim Woolsey, I don't know whether Jim is still here today.....Jim Woolsey tells a story that the rumor in the White House was that when that small airplane crashed into the side of the White House that it was Woolsey trying to get an appointment with the President. [laughter] I think that makes a difference, and the President was good enough to let me join him most mornings on his Daily Brief, and while his questions were usually directed to the briefer, it was an opportunity for me to see where we were coming up short, and to be sure that we followed through. I always got feedback from the briefer, but being there made all the difference, and also an opportunity to know if there was any lack of confidence in what the Community or I, personally, were doing. Sometimes it's not a question of lack of confidence, it's just something that has to be done on a political level. It wasn't Allen Dulles who resigned, as I recall, but Richard Bissell, and when he went to see the President, President Kennedy said, "If this were a parliamentary country, I'd have to resign, but it isn't, so you do." I think that it's important that the DCI maintain his personal integrity in dealing with his boss and telling him exactly what he thinks. I remember Griffin Bell, the Attorney General, used to say that he owes the

President his best opinion, and the President can fire him, but he's there to give his best opinion. That is what I felt was the role of the Intelligence Community, and my role as DCI, and so to those to whom....the question I guess was asked, on behalf of the students who may be here today, let me say that I am convinced that there is no agency in government that takes more seriously its responsibility to be accountable under law and to do its work according to American law. Obviously, the work that's required of clandestine collection does not permit us to observe all the laws of all the countries where we're gathering information, and that makes it all the more important that we be sensitive to our Constitutional responsibilities. And, as Dick Helms once pointed out, "While we may have to be deceiving in other places, we cannot deceive ourselves." And I think that we have tried very hard to be faithful to that in our reports and responsibilities to the President.

QUESTION: My question to the Panel is in regard to.....well, first of all, I teach American Government to college freshmen and sophomores in Houston, and my question to the Panel is in regard to legislative oversight of the Intelligence Community, especially in regard to the increased oversight that's taken place since the 1970s, and my question has to do with why the Legislative Branch is charged with overseeing the activities of the Executive Branch, and the Intelligence Community falls under the Executive Branch, security clearances are required for people that work for the CIA, for the NSA, etc., and I was wondering about the people in the committees, the Congressional committees, that are given access or exposed to TOP SECRET classified information about, if any of you

feel there is a possible security threat, or need for increased background checks of the members of Congress?

Judge Webster: That's a very good question, and, of course, you teach a course in which you're aware of the equal branches of government, and the Congress has, in the past, taken the position that it will be the determinator of the qualities and qualifications and availability for security clearances. We have, from time to time, reported information that casts doubt on particular individuals and what they were doing, including some members of Congress, largely through the FBI which has counterintelligence responsibilities. But they do try very hard, and they do....we have the two committees, the two select committees, to whom the Intelligence Community reports, and they are very carefully picked and their staffs are pretty carefully picked, and they act as surrogates for the entire Congress, so that we don't have 500 people plus all.....I've forgotten how many thousand people are up there.....having access to the information. It's pretty well controlled, and I'm not aware of very many breaches. In fact, my observation when I was at the FBI, which preceded by time with President Bush and President Reagan here, was that more leaks were coming out of the White House than coming out of those committees.

Secretary Cheney: If I could just say a word, having served on the House Intelligence Committee in the oversight role, the assumption is, or at least members of Congress are told when they're elected, the assumption is they automatically get a TOP SECRET clearance by virtue of being elected to the House of Representatives. In reality, there are some of them who probably couldn't get a TOP SECRET clearance if they went through

the normal process. And, the way it worked in the House was....this was....we have an elaborate procedure for assigning member to committees. We did not use it with respect to the Intelligence Committee. That was left solely within the purview of the Republican leader, and then Democratic Speaker. They had absolute authority over who went on the Intelligence Committee, and that helped, to some extent. The staff was first-rate. They did have the requisite clearances. My experience was that you got into a leak problem when you got involved in politically very controversial matters that were public, such as Iran-Contra affair, or aid to the Nicaraguan Contras, and you had groups within the Congress who had violent disagreements over those issues, and then, occasionally, leaks would occur because it was politically useful to somebody to leak. I'm not one who has been a big advocate of Congressional oversight over the years. I do think it's necessary, but Congress has to make absolutely certain they have a few people doing it, people who are trusted, and the rest of the Congress has to place their confidence in those individuals that they'll do it right.

General Scowcroft: I remember one particular case. There was a Congressman who had requested large amounts of material, some of it classified. And he started to put selected items in the Congressional Record. I went to the Speaker and said we had a big problem here, that I thought he ought to solve the problem, but if he didn't, we'd have to. The Speaker wasn't able to solve the problem, so I simply said there will be no more classified information given to that Congressman.

QUESTION: My name is Drew Endicott. This is directed essentially to, I guess, General Scowcroft, sir. I served four years in the Marine Corps, 1974-78. I was a rifleman, enlisted. Your generation came of age in a very tumultuous time when industrial warfare was the norm. In effect, President Bush had the distinction, I guess, of fighting, having an airplane shot out from under him, but we're moving away from that. I foresee a time not too far away when leaders were raised on the Nintendo view of war, Star Trek view of war, and have not actually worn a uniform and stood and watched the rain and seen their friends lying on the ground screaming for their mother. You cannot separate the destiny of nations from military conflict. How is the Intelligence Community going to insure that our leaders know that a decision to engage in armed conflict isn't merely pushing a button or seeing which light blinks. It's people actually being blown to smithereens.

General Scowcroft: I think that's a big problem that faces our society in several ways. The most recent manifestation was Kosovo, which, I think, could have sent signals that are very deleterious to us, but I think it goes back a lot deeper than that. For 40 years after World War II, there were large parts of the American adult population who had served in the military. It was taken for granted, and they understood what a mess war is, how plans never get executed the way you think they're going to, all of that familiarity. We had a series of Presidents who had all been in the military. Now that is ending, and the military is going to be a much more specialized part of society, much more isolated from society than it's ever been before. I think there may be profound implications to that, but I have no idea what to do about it.

QUESTION: Good morning, gentlemen. The process of gathering intelligence is heavily dependent on advanced technology, satellites, transmissions from various sorts, and, obviously, high-altitude reconnaissance. My question is, is that....and the whole Panel can please comment on it, is that our heavy reliance on high tech reconnaissance in intelligence gathering is done at the expense of resources that can be used for field personnel.

Secretary Cheney: I'll just make a quick comment. You need both. You know, it shouldn't be an either/or proposition, and we spend a lot of money, obviously, on the high tech end of collection, but we do some truly amazing things out there. I think over the years, our capabilities in that regard have been absolutely essential. We talked earlier about the arms control proposal in September of 1991. A very, very important part of that was to make certain we knew what the other side had, what their capabilities were, and most of that information was gathered by national technical means, using expensive, highly expensive, systems. Now, obviously, we're faced.....the world's changed a bit. We're a lot more worried about terrorism, and non-state sponsored kinds of groups, and we clearly need to have first-rate human intelligence, as well, too. If I were to criticize anything, it's our seeming inability to hire people and let them deal with some of the bad guys around the world. We find out that some captain in some military organization who's corrupt, is on the CIA payroll and there's immediate outcry, "My God, we've got a corrupt guy on the CIA payroll." Well, who else are you going to put....I mean, if you're out and really seriously want to penetrate those organizations, those are exactly the kinds

of people you ought to have on the payroll. It's....we often ignore what's required of the Agency, if they're going to get quality human intelligence, they do have to deal with some pretty seedy people, and we ought to welcome it, not criticize it.

General Scowcroft: I would just basically say "amen" to that. I think our high-tech intelligence was built up because the critical need for this country during the Cold War was that we not be militarily surprised and wake up some morning at a severe strategic disadvantage. We need to keep that up because we need that high tech capability now for a lot of other things, because it's a very messy world. But that also means the kind of world we have now makes intelligence, to me, more important, perhaps, than it was even during the Cold War, because we're getting involved in things that during the Cold War we wouldn't have paid much attention to in areas of the world about which we know very little, and we need to be better, and a lot of that is human intelligence. As Dick said, the drugs, terrorism, the best way to deal with terrorism is not to build jersey walls around the Washington Monument, and so on. It's to get out and penetrate the organizations and stop terrorism at the beginning, not try to clean up after it.

Judge Webster: I agree with everything that's been said, and I think it's well to remember that, in terms of human intelligence, there's always a cry for more human intelligence after something has happened when we haven't had it, or had it sufficiently. It is not something you can put up on the shelf and take down and then let it go fallow and then suddenly need it and have it go back and be effective. Much of the really rich material in key areas around the world that have come through intelligence have been growing up

with people who have finally gotten themselves into positions of important access where that information they can give us is important to the decision making process, and that takes years and years. It should be an ongoing and steady commitment to be sure that we know the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries and to do it by human means. We're doing extraordinary things at the technical level, but that does not guarantee that we're going to have those answers, and it's not a question of shifting gears....go back to human intelligence, it's a question of maintaining a sufficient level of human intelligence in the field to follow up on, to inform the work of the national technical means people, and vice versa. We need them both.

QUESTION: Richard Harknett, Professor at the University of Cincinnati. Wanted to build on a comment that Robert Kimmitt made earlier about one of the challenges is that intelligence is going to have a more difficult time keeping up with information, that we're in an environment of increasing scope and speed of public information, from the CNN effect to satellite to the Internet. What kind of role or different dynamic do you think is going to be set up for senior policymakers to have to deal with intelligence in this larger, expanding environment of public information?

((Tape 2)

Judge Webster: Things that we have observed through national technical means, but today access is often provided by scientists and business leaders around the world. We don't task them, we don't turn them into operatives, but we are very welcoming of the

information that they can bring back to us, because they have a better access than some of our spies.

QUESTION: [Continued] That's where I was kind of going with this is that in the context of the intelligence delivering to senior policymakers who now can turn on the TV, can receive information from other sources, is there a different dynamic emerging as those sources, public sources, become increasingly pervasive?

Judge Webster: Well, I think you're going to have to get stronger and stronger drives to deal with all the information that's coming in and be able to sort out the specifics that we want, and the dynamics are changing all the time. Slightly different analogy—I used to....we had these secure phones that you push a button and they take us into the key National Security Advisors.....I'd push the button and get ahold of Brent, and I'd say, "A SCUD was launched one minute ago in the general direction of Riyadh. Watch CNN." Because we didn't know where the SCUD was going to land, they were very inaccurate, but CNN was there, and we were not. At least, not for that purpose.

General Scowcroft: I think that there's little impact. There's a generally bigger problem, but, you know, being on the outside now, I would guess that you can get from open literature 90 percent of what you need to make decisions. The other 10 percent is really valuable. I think a bigger problem we have is that our new systems are capable of amassing such tremendous volumes of information. We cannot process it. And we're going to have to get a new way to do it. I mean, the stuff that our satellites provide, some

of it extremely valuable, goes unattended to because there's no way we can manually process all that stuff, and that's a major problem ahead of us.

QUESTION: My name's David Richardson. I'm a professor at [name lost] University in Springfield, Missouri. In some of the research that I'm conducting right now, I've had occasion to interview former General Vilishev Borasov, and he indicated, in the interview that I conducted with him, that he felt that the Soviet/Russian military is in a state right now where they're in search of a leader. General Alexander Lebed's recent book that was published last year, seems to indicate the same thing. Given that, and given the several references that we have had at this Conference about the fact that, while institutions have changed in the former Soviet Union, but not necessarily mindsets and attitudes, and as recently as yesterday with General Kalugin, the thought patterns are still there. Given those two sets of circumstances, could you speculate on the possibility if a leader such as Lebed or someone else with some degree of charisma that has the confidence of the military establishment now in Russia were to rise to power, would this possibly signal a warming or a return to nationalist concepts and maybe a type of national socialism or something like this?

Secretary Cheney: Well, I don't know what's going to happen in Russia. I do know General Lebed. He hosted me once when he was Commander of the 106th Airborne Division. This would have been back in about 1990 or '91 on one of my visits over there. I've since spent some time with him on a couple of occasions. I've been struck by the fact that he did not opt for the military route in terms of trying to achieve political power,

but rather, decided to run for office. He went out to Krasnoyarsk, ran for, and got elected Governor of Krasnoyarsk. A lot of people believe that he'll run for President next time around, using that Krasnoyarsk base, but I can't say that there won't be, or there is now, no one over there obviously who's plotting some kind of military takeover. I simply don't know. But I have been struck that someone like General Lebed decided, whereas he clearly had the requisite credentials, if you will, to seek power by military means, he chose not to do that—at least not so far, anyway.

General Scowcroft: I think history is no definite predictor of the future, but, if you look back at Russian history, there have been few cases where the military as a military has taken over, not many men on horseback, not many military coups--strong men, but the military has generally been a good servant of the executive. Now what's going on in Chechnya now looks like a military with the bit in its teeth, but the Prime Minister and the President are out in front.

QUESTION: I'm William Mackenzie from Dallas. I want to thank you and your staff, the Bush School, and all your participants for a marvelous conference, and thank you so very much.

QUESTION: Peter Scharfmann, I work at the Mitre Corporation. This is on a comment that Secretary Cheney made about being given lists of things he might want to know about, and possibly checking off too many of them. The Intelligence Community is always in the business of investing in the ability to answer questions in the future as well

as answering questions today. It seems to me that there's been a certain amount of flailing around in the ten years since the Cold War ended over how to think about where to invest. Not so much where to invest in terms of specific technical capabilities, but how to judge what kinds of information would be needed by policymakers in the future in order to invest in having that information available when it's needed. And I wondered whether you or other members of the Panel, from your experience, could give some thoughts on how to draw the balance between competing with The New York Times, or The Economist, for what's hot today, versus investing in knowledge that, right now, nobody cares about.

Judge Webster: I don't have the answer, but I think that your point is well taken and that intelligence best serves the country when it can identify, with the help of the policymakers, those things for which we have no ready answers and see either trouble or opportunity on the horizon and prepares to have the data to supply it.

General Scowcroft: I don't know if you referred, in your flailing around, to the debate about whether we should put more emphasis on economic intelligence, for example. I think that would be a mistake. I think in terms of information available, we're so much better off there, and we already do the part that's related to security, so I wouldn't go in that direction.

Secretary Cheney: One thing I'd pick up on....a point that I think Bill made earlier....one of the things we do that I think just pays enormous dividends long term is to allow young

people from overseas to come get educated in American universities. In a sense, it's a 20, or 30, or 40 year investment, but it has an enormous impact, I think, long term, and I still, in my travels around the world run into people today that I deal with that went to....you know, they were at Texas A&M in 1963 working on a degree in agricultural economics, and today they'll be a prominent government official or heavily involved in business. It just builds a network. It hasn't got, you know, the sanction, and shouldn't have, the sanction of the Intelligence Community, per se, but the network of relationships we build up through our educational system, that at the upper level's the best in the world, is absolutely invaluable to us long term.

QUESTION: Chip Beck. As a CIA officer, I had the unique experience of being regarded in some circles as having defected to a hostile intelligence service when I married a female special agent of the FBI. Fortunately, the leader of that hostile intelligence service was, by then, Director of Central Intelligence, and I refer to Judge Webster, so my bacon was saved a little bit. My question to you all is, given the FBI's historical role in counterintelligence and the somewhat expanded role recently under Director Freeh and operations involving counterterrorism, money laundering, and the expanded legal attaché program, do any of you gentlemen foresee or recommend in a future Administration a more visible role of the FBI in such groups as Deputies Committees, or anything else of that nature, in the intelligence process to a degree that maybe hasn't been present, you know, in the recent history?

General Scowcroft: I hope not.

GE: Well, that was terse. Last question.

QUESTION: I came to Texas A&M in September of 1942, as a 16-year-old kid from Parris, Texas. The Bush School is the best thing that ever happened to this campus, and I thank you, Mr. President. I do have a concern. When I joined the Navy, they were still building airplanes and ships. But I think we will all agree that industry was the thing that really won World War II. I have seen over the last many years industry start to play a much stronger role in intelligence. I'm concerned, as I see our industry, through mergers that may be necessary, but I see a declining importance of industry to our country. I see an increase in the thought that software will solve all our problems, when, ultimately, the war is fought with hardware. I just would like to have an opinion from the Panel as to what that situation may present to us in the future. I represent industry, although I've served the Intelligence Community my entire career. I represented industry.

General Scowcroft: Well, I'll take an initial crack at it. We have gone through a rapid consolidation of defense-related industry. We've gone from a proliferation of prime contractors down to three now. Europe is now starting the same kind of process. I think we don't know yet whether our own consolidation has gone too far too fast. It's quite possible. We don't know what's going to happen to Europe. I agree with you that we need to look very carefully at this, and we're at the point where, I think, the government probably can't just sit back and say, "Well, let's let market forces take over," because we are dealing, as you point out, with the fundamental sinews that we need to protect

ourselves. I don't have an answer, but it's a problem which is confronting us more and more every day.

Secretary Cheney: I would add, part of the difficulty is the technology is changing so rapidly and is so widely available, that it's almost impossible now to think of a crucial piece of military technology that is owned by or developed by a defense contractor, nobody else has it or can get access to it. I think that's a shrinking body of knowledge. And when you think about the way in which international boundaries are breaking down, companies are global in their conduct in terms of how they handle themselves, the role of the Internet, the flow of information that will be probably at the heart of any future successful military endeavor. It's increasingly difficult for us to think about developing that capability and then deploying it in the way we used to. When you've got a defense contractor, Defense Department issues the contract, buys the capability and away we go. It's gotten a lot more complicated than that.

Judge Webster: That question, I've been thinking about the previous question, and there is a correlation, and that is, the internationalization of crime in the world today and by that I include terrorism and drugs and other activities, requires a continuing look at how we go about defending ourselves from it, and increasingly, the FBI has been drawn into the international arena because of the various types of international crime, including a significant white-collar crime, Russian-organized crime, for example, operating in the United States, and I think the question assumed that somehow the FBI was out of the loop. It may not be a part of the Deputies Committee, but it is very definitely a part of the

international struggle to protect our society and our values. I attended a lecture earlier this week at Georgetown University in which Louis Freeh went out of his way to talk about the splendid relationship that exists between him and George Tenet, our DCI, in terms of attacking and dealing with these problems. I suppose there are going to be a lot of shaking out to do as more and more of American special agents are functioning in various capacities abroad, but I don't think you need to bring everybody to the Deputies table, but you should know that those relationships are constantly improving, and the trust and cooperation, likewise.

GE: Let me make one quick announcement before we thank our panelists. We're on a somewhat tight schedule today because of the ceremony, so we're going to move directly into lunch in about two minutes. Now join me in thanking our panelists for an excellent session.

Bg: 12/28/99